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DULLES AND AQUINAS ON REVELATION 
I. Beginning the Dialogue 
RESPECT FOR Avery Dulles' achievement in Models of Revelation 1 need not consist entirely in "enthu-siastic recognition of its many merits " 2 even though 
it is " rthe mature reflection of an experienced teacher " and 
"as of now ... the most comprehensive treatment on revela-
tion in the English-speaking world ".8 Learning from it in-
volves recognizing the " worthwhileness of dialogue with Dul-
les' work" .4 In this questions are essential to advancing the 
discussion. 
This article will proceed in appreciative dialogue by means 
of critical questions and will move in the direction of modi-
fying aspects of Dulles.' basic principle in Models of Revela-, 
tion. Dialogue, according to the hermeneutical work of H.-G. 
Gadamer, 5 is not first of all a genre for organizing and present-
ing themes and ideas already attained. It belongs to the act 
of understanding itself, occurs in reading a text, always takes 
place in and through tradition and is one of the ways in which 
interpretation enters into every experience. In this light, the 
Summa Theologiae 6 of St. Thomas Aquinas belongs to a read-
1 Avery Dulles, Models of Revelation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1983). 
2 Bernard Cooke, "God Revealing in Symbol", Commonweal 110:308, May 
20, 1983. ' 
1 Dermot Lane, "A Review Essay: Dulles on Revelation", The Living 
Light, 21:74-76, Oct. 1984; p. 74. 
'William Loewe, review in New Catholic World, 226:185, July-August, 
1983. 
IIHans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1982); 
pp. 325-341, 345-351. 
8 St. Thomas Aquina , Summa. 'l'heologiae, Vol. 45, Prophecy and Other 
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ing of Models of Revelation, despite the absence of evidence 
that it influenced Dulles' theology of revelation. It does not be-
long to it, that is, because it served as a source for Models of 
Revelation. Nevertheless, the Summa is within, and has sig-
nificantly changed, the theological tradition shared by Models 
of Revelation. Reading Dulles' book in light of its tradition, 
then, brings Aquinas into the dialogue 7 in a way that would 
not be appropriate for ·a strictly historical-theological analysis 
of influences upon Dulles' theology of revelation. 
The Summa stands as a classic 8 work in the Catholic theo-
logical tradition. The inescapable magnitude of Aquinas' 
achievement makes it pertinent to every part of that tradition . 
Karl Rahner judged that, " Thomas Aquinas is to be num-
bered among the great figures of theology with whom any con-
temporary theology must engage in a genuine dialogue" .9 
Rahner observed, too, the way in which attitudes toward 
Aquinas have changed. He noted," From being the teacher of 
theology in the theological schools themselves, Thomas has 
acquired the status of a Father of the Church ".10 In this new 
and somewhat reduced condition, Aquinas' texts can assume 
their true proportions as theological classics whose claim upon 
generation after generation arises. not so much from official 
sanction as from their self-evidencing power to speak about 
subject-matter whose intrinsic significance brings it before a 
succession of eras and to a variety of cultures. It is easy 
Charisms ( 2a2ae, 171-8), Latin text; Eno-li h .translation, Introduction, Notes, 
Appendices & Glo ary by Roland Potter, O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Co., 1969). English tran lations and Latin text will be from Vol. 45 
through-out this article; reference will be to parts of Aquinas' art icle. 
7 M.-D. Chenu's Toward Understanding St. Thomas, translated by A-M 
Landry & D. Hughes (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964), it is true, places the 
modern reader in dialogue with medieval texts through careful recovery of 
their context . But the relation hip tends to I ad into Aquina 's texts and 
their meaninO' rather than back from them to contemporary themes. 
8 H.-G. adamer, pp. 253-25 . 
o Karl Rahner, "On Recognizing the Importance of Thomas Aquinas", 
Theological Investigations Vol. XIII, translated by D. Bourke (New York: 
Seabury Press, 1975); pp. 3-12, 6-7. 
10 Rabner, p. 4. 
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enough to see that dialogue with Aquinas inspired the work of 
Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan as well as the early writ-
ings of Edward Schillebeeckx and Johann Baptist Metz. 
Yet this is not to propose tha:t Dulles likewise constructed 
Models of Revelation under the inspiration of Aquinas even if 
not from direct use of Aquinas. Nor is it to presuppose that 
Aquinas' teaching needs to be regarded as " the one great 
ocean into which all conceivable streams of wisdom and knowl-
edge flow and converge, so that it is from this ocean alone 
that we must draw our knowledge and inspiration, all other 
sources now being superfluous ".11 Rather, it is to set forth in 
preliminary manner the kind of relevance obtaining between 
a classical and a contemporary theology of revelation. I t is to 
indicate in the briefest fashion that a common tradition and a 
subject-matter central to it constitute an initial justification for 
inquiring into Models of Revelation with the help of the 
Summa T heologiae. 
Still, Dulles' critique of neo-Scholastic theology of revela-
tion in Chapter III, " Revelation as Doctrine " could be read 
as preventing this dialogue. Far from offering insight into 
revelation, Aquinas' theology might be thought to be the pro-
totypical case of revelation-as-doctrine, in which revelation is 
God's word manifesting and communicating divine knowledge 
"in the form of words having a clear propositional content." 12 
And, if such a superseded Catholic neo-Scholastic version of 
propositional revelation looked back to Aquinas in some re-
spects, does this not end the possibility of fruitful dialogue 
with. him? 
Allaying that suspicion will he the first moment in the 
dialogue. Does Aquinas fall under Dulles' critique of tevela-
tion-as-doctrine? To the extent that this model attributes an 
objectionably high degree of conceptual clarity and precision 
to revelation, almost as if God were at pains to abide by Car-
tesian norms, Aquinas' theology of revelation simply does not 
11 Rahner, p. 10. 
12 Dulles, p. 45. 
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fit within the model Chapter III outlines and rejects. As long 
ago as 1949 Victor White 13 showed that for Aquinas clear and 
precisely defined ooncepts were not essential to revelation. He 
pointed out that " St. Thomas describes the typical revelation 
as ' quaedam cognitio obumbrata et oscuritate admixta . . .' 
(De Veritate 12.12) ".14 For Aquinas, prophetic perception of 
the divine was "everything of which the controlled, orderly, 
logical and scientific reason is most suspicious ".u; Aquinas 
recognized, ~said White, that in prophetic revelation "the typi-
cal vehicle is not the rational concept, but the concrete image, 
the phantasy, the dream, the hypnogogic uncontrolled imagi-
nation (De Ver. 12.7.8; 2-2 173.2, etc) ".16 White pointed out 
that Aquinas' commentary on Hebrews 1:1 "stresses the extra-
ordinary variety to b'e found in the methods which God has de-
vised .to make his saving ways known to men-even in the Old 
Testament alone" .17 And ~among those ways, it was especially 
" the immense richness and variety of symbolism which revela-
tion has employed for its medium ".18 Aquinas, through famil- . 
arity with the Old Testament, saw that, as White said, "imagi-
nation is par excellence the vehicle of prophetic vision (De 
Ver. 12.7) ".19 Moreover, he recognized that the images seen by 
the prophets were not" mere signs for what is otherwise know-
able, but true symbols for what wholly transcends sense-per-
ception or rational comprehension ".20 White's distinction be-
tween sign and symbol and his locating the essential role of 
symbols in Aquinas' idea of revelation opens up an affinity 
with Dulles' distinction between indicators and symbols as well 
as with his emphasis on symbolic mediation. 
In fact, Dulles begins Chapter IX, " Symbolic Mecliation ", 
13 Victor White, O.P., " St. Thomas's Conception of Revelation ", Dominican 
Studies, Vol. 1, No. I, Jan. 1948; pp. 3-35. 
H White, p. 7. 
l t5 White, p. 6. 
1 6 White, p. 7. 
11 White, p. II. 
1s White, p. II. 
19 White, p. 20. 
20 White, p. 20. 
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with an introductory comment on transcendence and symbol-
ism that comes close to White's definition of what symbols do. 
Dulles remarks: " The poets have long been familiar with the 
connection between symbol and revelation. Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge affirmed very simply: 'It is by Symbols alone that 
we can acquire intellectual knowledge of the Divine' ".21 Yet a 
difference between Aquinas ·and Dulles also emerges from 
White's further exposition of Aquinas. White joins to symbols 
something that Dulles, and arguably Coleridge, omit from 
knowledge of the divine. There is no escaping, that is, the 
central role of intellectual judgment in Aquinas' theology of 
revelation, and White does it some justice. For he states that 
in Aquinas there" is no apprehension of truth or falsehood, nor 
of veracious vision as opposed to hallucination (cf. 1-2,77.2; 
De Malo 3.3, 9) without a judgment or its equivalent 
(1.16.2) ".22 In White's view Aqujnas has room for both sym-
bolic knowledge of the divine and for the judgment affirming 
its truth. 
Does the important role for symbols mean that for Aquinas 
God revealed through obscure, and symbolic, messages instead 
of by means of clearly conceived formulae? Rene Latourelle's 
The Theology of Revelation 23 suffices to exempt Aquinas from 
the anthropomorphism that imagines divine communication 
taking place essentiaHy through delivery of verbal statements, 
transparently clear or runic as the case may be, to a prophet 
who then gives assent. Latourelle remarked that Aquinas saw 
that "between the human word and the divine word there is 
an analogy ".24 The divine word of revelation was not just like 
the teacher instructing a pupil through spoken discourse. 
Aquinas ·said that God revealed to the prophets by means of 
· an inner word, and that tJhis inner word " is merely illumina-
21 Dulles, p. 131. 
12 White, p. 24. 
18 Ren~ Latourelle, Theol<>gy of R evelation ( taten I land, N.Y.: Alba 
Bouse, 1967); pp. 159-179. 
2
' La.tourelle, p. 166. 
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tion of the mind " 25 so that the prophet can perceive some-
thing of divine ·things. In this regard, it can be said that the 
word of God comes into being in the mind of the prophet, as 
well as that it comes to the prophet, since what " comes to " 
the prophet is illumination essentially and not primarily verbal 
statements. 
There are no less than four principles in 173,2 26 in particular 
that inhibit attributing the objectionable model to Aquinas. 
First, Aquinas strictly limited the teacher /pupil analogy for 
divine/human communication. This analogy lay at the root of 
the revelation-as-doctrine model, according to Dulles. The 
likeness between God revealing and a teacher instructing is in 
the giving of representations or ideas to another. God can do 
this directly by infusing them into the mind of the prophet, to 
whom God, therefore, is immanent.27 The teacher can do this 
by .speaking or writing; he "furnishes his pupils with realities 
through word-symbols" 28 in propositions or statements. How-
ever, although it is not the point AquinaJs made directly and 
25 Latourelle, p. 177, note 93: "Perceptio divinae locutionis, qua prophetam 
alloquitur interius, quae nihil est quam mentis illustratio" (De Ver., 12. 1, 
ad 3). 
26 Question 173 takes up "the manner . of prophetic knowledge" in four 
articles. Article 2, while only a fraction of Aquinas' theology of revelation, 
gives clear exposition of one principle: the act of revealing is an act of en-
lightenment, and the gift of divine light is the formal characteristic of pro-
phetic revelation. Prophecy and Inspiration, Paul Synave, O.P. and Pierre 
Benoit, O.P. (New York: Desclee Co., 1961) pp. 33-38 analyzes in detail 
173, 2 in regard to the several ways the prophet's mind could be engaged by 
God. 
Some other loci for Aquinas' theology of revelation, in addition to 2a2ae, 
171-178 are: DeVer. 12; S.C.G. L III, c.154; IVc. 25; lf)(l)pos. in Joannemj 
A.d Hebraeos j In Boet. de Trin. 2, 3, ad 7; Summa Theologiae, I, 1; 2a2ae, 
1-7; la2ae, 1, 6. 
·21 173, 2 Responsio: "In this second respect [conferral of species], not in the 
first [conferral of light], human teaching can be likened to prophetic revela-
tion, for a man furnishes his pupil with realities through word-symbols, but 
he cannot illumine from within as God does." 
Of. also, 172, 6, ad 2m: "Demons manifest to men what they know, not by 
enlightening their intelligences, but by giving them imaginative vision, or 
even by addressing them in terms of sense-impressions." 
2s Note 27. 
DULLES AND AQUINAS ON REVELATION 451 
explicitly, God communicates not through statements but 
through infused species. New knowledge or new images can 
also come from divine !influence upon the prophet's imagina-
tion stirring familiar images to a new arrangement, or from new 
sensible objects known in an ordinary way. The very fact that 
divine delivery of propositions to a prophet does not occur in 
every case demonstrates that it is not essential to, and is not 
formally the character of, revelation, should it occur. 
Second, every analogy labors under the law of incommensur-
ability according to which every similarity between the created 
and the uncreated contains a still greater dissimilarity. With-
out fonnal reference to this, Aquinas nonetheless respected it in 
regard to the teacher/pupil analogy. The major difference be-
tween God revealing and a teacher discoursing to pupils lay in 
the fact that the teacher" cannot illumine from within as God 
does ".29 Despite the most earnest efforts by students, no 
teacher can communicate more than intelligible signs, leaving 
the illuminati~n of them-:-or not-to the light of the student's 
own mind; the light itself in which the teacher grasps and 
judges an argument cannot be communicated. God, on the . 
other 'ha:nd, can and does give precisely the light enabling the 
prophet to perform the judgment in that light; God communi-
cates not only-in some case£---'intelligible species, but also the 
light within which to judge bheir divine meaning and truth. 
And this is part of the uniqueness of the way in which God, 
and no creature, can communicate to and in a human mind. 
Third, Aquinas did not present each and every act of judg-
ing taken into account. in 173,2 as an instance of judgment act-
ing upon a pre-formed proposition. In this article, and accord-
ing toP. Lee,30 in Aquinas' whole theory of judgm·ent, there is 
28 Note 27. 
80 Patrick Lee,· in "Aquinas on Knowledge of Truth and Existence", The 
Nefl) Scholasticism, Vol. LX, 1, Winter, 1986, pp. 46-71, argues convincingly 
that the position John of St. Thomas held on judgment is mistaken. Accord-
ing to John of St. Thomas, the first act of mind apprehends or forms a 
proposition which the second act of mind judges to be true or false. Lee con-
siders the aet of judging to be identical with composing or dividing a proposi-
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no reason to think that the second act of the mind consists 
essentially in assenting to a pre-formed proposition offered to 
the prophet for a divinely assisted consent and subsequent 
proclamation to others. Instead, in 173,2, and in Aquinas' 
theory of judgment, the operation of composing or dividing is 
precisely that which .forms and proposes. For the prophet, the 
word of God forms in the judgment. 
For example, the case most able to be thought of as an in-
stance of propositional revelation in 173,2 concerns the words 
written across the wall of Belshazzar's hall in Daniel 5. It 
might be possible to construe them as an elliptical sentence de-
claring in cryptic manner the political fortune of Belshazzar.31 
If this were the case, and if Aquinas conceived revealing as an 
act of divinely enlightened assent to a diViinely formulated and 
transmitted sentence, then Daniel's prophecy would amount to 
decoding the words in a first act that formed a proposition and 
then, by divine enlightenment, affirming its truth on the basis 
of its divine origin and authority in a second act. But, in fact, 
it is otherwise in 173,2. Daniel interpreted the words in an act 
of revealing that simultaneously apprehended their meaning 
and affirmed it as God's verdict on Belshazzar. That Aquinas 
explicitly ·saw Daniel's prophecy as an act of judging and not as 
apprehending is clear from the way ·he argued from this case 
to the conclusion that prophecy consists essentially in the con-
tion. "Proposition" here "refers not to the sentence, a. linguistic entity but, 
to what a. declarative sentence typically signifies, viz. a complex object of 
thought which is true or false, and which has; "at least typically, a subject-
predicate structure," Lee. p. 48. 
In respect to the act of judging, as distinct from the content previously 
known, Aquinas' theology of revelation does not involve propositions, but 
primarily the inner word of enlightened judgment and only secondarily an 
outer word communicable to others. It is helpful to note, in this regard, the 
difference between the act of revelation, formally characterized as enlighten· 
ment, and the transmission of it to others by speech, which Aquinas identified 
as a distinct charism, in 177. 
81173, 2, Responsio: "And so if anyone is favored by a God-given represen· 
tation of certain realities through imaginative images, as with Pharoah and 
N ebuchadnezzar; or through bodily images, as with Belshazzar-such are not 
to be considered prophets, unless their minds are enlightened for judging." 
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ferral of new light for judgment. In that argument Daniel's in-
terpretation exemplified the distinction between receiving new 
species (the words seen by all) and the gift of new light (which 
Daniel alone received). In this judgment, Daniel was not con-
sidered to be doing what pertains to the first act of the mind, 
apprehending the ideas conveyed by the words, but what per-
tains to the second act of the mind, asserting the truth. That 
is what made him a prophet. It is not the case, that is, that 
Daniel first apprehended the words in their meaning formu-
lated into a proposition, then secondly, judged that these are 
true words. Aquinas did not treat enlightenment as an act 
upon · a proposition formulated prior to and apart from 
judgment then subsequently given over to judgment. This 
would be what the revelation-as-doctrine model would ex-
pect Aquinas to teach if he adhered to that idea of revelation. 
Fourth, wha;t is common to prophecies is the giving of new 
light for judging. That is what Aquinas affirmed [n order to 
move to the conclusion that the multiplicity in prophecies de-
rives not from that light ~·ut from new species. In 173,2, how-
ever, Aquinas did not equate the gift of new light with the re-
ception of a new proposition, as if the new light had a new 
proposition for its formal object. Three cases of prophecy, for 
example, do not even involve words: Joseph interpreting 
Pharoa:h's dream; Jeremiah seeing a boiling pot facing away 
from the north (Jer. 1: 13); Daniel interpreting Nebuchad-
nezzar's dream. Yet all of these are acts of revelation. There-
fore, the act of judgment in revelation does not necessarily have 
verbal statements as itS object. Prophetic judgment is not a 
matter essentially of ratifying verbal messages received from 
God. It is also true that Aquinas did not exclude this, and in 
l1J- Joannem, c.5, lect. 6 referred to divine spoken words in 
Jesus' baptism :in bhe Jordan and at the Transfiguration. 
Thus, Aquinas in 173,2 does not fit neB~tly under the model 
of revelation-as-doctrine. Because of this, there sti.Jl remains 
open the possibility that there can be further dialogue between 
Dulles and Aquinas. What differences or conflicts there are can 
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be understood in a context other than that of the inadequate 
model of revelation-as-,doctrine. 
2. Summa Theologiae, 2a2ae,l73,2 as Counter-point 
to Chapter IX, " Symbolic Mediation " 
In Chapter IX Dulles argues the principle essential to the 
theology of revelation expounded in P art Two of Models of 
Revelation. Revelation, he proposes, is "always mediated 
through symbol ".32 In diverging from models treating revela-
tion as doctrine, as event, as inner experience, as dialectical 
presence, and as new awareness, he does not deductively apply 
a general theory of symbol to revelation since ·his ideas on sym-
bol are themselves influenced by revelation and faith-.33 And 
his focus falls on the mediation of revelation, not so much on 
its content, though the two are inseparable. How does God 
reveal?' God's self-manifestation is "always mediated through 
symbol ". This means, he adds, that revelation is mediated by 
means of" an externaHy perceived sign that works mysterious-
ly on the human consciousness so as to .suggest more than it 
can clearly describe or define ".34 This principle will enable 
Dulles to retrieve and to incorporate into a symbolic theology 
elements fro·m the five models analyzed and set aside in Part 
One. Did Aquinas, though, teach anything like symbolic 
mediation? 
In general 35 Aquinas conceived divine revelation as an act 
of divinely enlightened knowledge and as one of the three ways 
in which human beings know something of divine things . The 
other two are rational ascent from knowledge of the objects of 
e~erience to some limited knowledge that God exists, is one, 
is first cause, is wise, etc., and beatific vision, which is vision be-
cause not mediated by created realities and their intelligibili-
·ties. Beatifi.c vision is direct participation in divine knowledge, 
32 Dulles, p. 131. 
33 Dulles, p. ix. 
84 Dulles, p. 131. 
35 Cf. Latourelle, p. 159, ff. 
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but not with a comprehensive grasp of the divine essence. That 
which is revealed, the content of revelation,36 is some part of 
divine things. Divine things are what God knows, whether 
these be human or divine, past, present or future acc<>rding to 
created existence and knowledge. In the act of revealing God 
let the prophet know what is, but is far removed from human 
knowledge. God lifted the veil of ignorance preventing the mind 
of the prophet from perceiving what is real but above human 
comprehension. Such prophetic revelation was a charism for 
the common salvific good of humanity, not solely for the per-
sonal good of the prophet. Its social destiny brought a second-
ary ~harism to the prophet, the ability to communicate what 
had been given in the act of revealing.37 
Also, though an extra-ordinary gift, and in no way due to a 
person's capacities of desires/8 the act of enlightenment by 
God was not the gift of faith nor was revealing received in an 
act of belief or faith. Rather it was divinely conferred and ac-
tuated knowledge for co1nmunication to others, who did receive 
it in an act of faith in q~d and in the content. The prophets 
were obviously people of faith but what made them prophets . 
was not the faith they shared with their fellow Israelites but 
the charism of knowledge given by God for Israel, and beyond. 
In the Summa~ 2a2ae,l73,2 presents with unmistakable di-
rectness the principle essential for understanding how Aquinas 
conceived the way in which GDd revealed. In 173,2, Aquinas 
inquired " whether in prophetic revelation God infuses new 
species in the mind of the prophet, or simply grants a new 
light ".39 The central argument is over how God revealed what 
was given to a prophet. Was it exclusively "new light " so 
16 On the questions pertaining to content, cf. also the discussion on "sacra 
doctrina ": James Weisheipl, O.P., "The Meaning of Sacra Doctrina in Sum-
ma Theologiae I, q. 1 ", The Thomist 38: 1-2, Jan.-Apr. 1974; pp. 49-80. 
17 Summa Theologiae, 2a2ae, 177-178. 
18 S-umma Theologiae, 2a2ae, 172, 3, 4. 
19 S-umma Theologiae, 2a2ae, 173, 2, "utrum in prophetica revelatione im-
primantur divinitus menti propheta novae rerum species, vel solum novum 
lumen". The Latin text will be given selectively, not regularly. 
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that a prophet understood in new and divine perspective mat-
ters already learned from human experience? 40 or had God also 
sometimes given "new species", that is, . new knowledge not 
gained from previous experience? Aquinas argued that God's 
gift cannot be restricted to the conferring or infusing of new 
light for judgment, though sometimes God did just that. Some-
times, Aquinas pointed out, God had also given new content to 
knowledge. For example, the words written across the wall in 
Belshazzar's banquet hall in Daniel 5 were new sensible ob-
jects. In Jeremiah 1:13, God gave Jeremiah a new fantasy, 
that of a "boiling pot facing away from ·the north". More-
over, if God had given only new light for judging what had 
already become part of the prophet's human knowledge and 
experience, there woul~ be no basis for the diversity and multi-
plicity of prophetic revelations, since all would consist in the 
same thing, new divine enlightenment, which was what formal-
ly fulfilled and characterized prophecy. What was common to 
all would be also, then, the basis for their multiplicity as well .41 
The divine light alone cannot be taken as the sole source 
for new and diverse knowledge of divine things received in 
prophecy. 
But the main element in 173,2 germane to Models of Revela-
tion is not so much the conclusion that " in prophetic revela-
tion there is a new infusion of species and not simply an in-
tellectual light" 42 as the exposition of the role judgment plays 
in prophecy. The act of revelation on its human side respected 
the structure of human knowledge wpile it fulfilled and ele-
vated it. Because prophecy was an act of knowledge, divinely 
40 The first objection proposed that "in prophetic revelation God impresses 
no new species of realities on the prophet's mind, but merely a new light" be-
cause prophets " use images of objects with which they are famili ar ". 
41 173, 2, Sed contra: "But the multiplying of visions is not the work of 
intellectual light, which is common to all prophetic vision, by [ sio : but] 
only according to the diversity of species, according to which there comes 
about an assimilation.". 
42 173, 2, Sed contra: "Videtur quod in prophetica. revelatione imprimantur 
novae species rerum, et non solum intelligibile lumen." 
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given to be sure, it can be examined in its human activity. So, 
Aquinas stated, " Two points arise as regards the knowledge 
of a human rillnd." 43 He proceeded to .analyze prophetic reve-
lation according to the two aspects present in all human know-
ing. In prophecy, too, there was both" the acceptance or repre-
sentation of things and then the judgment about what is pre-
sented ".44 Revelation involved one or the other or both. 
The full case of prophecy involved both because knowledge or 
understanding (apprehension) prior to the act of judging re-
mained incomplete. But there w:lis no parity between recep-
tion of new species, the re-arranging 45 of familiar imgaes 
or ideas, and the act of judging. The gift of new species by it-
self was not yet revelatory since their truth and meaning had 
not been grasped. Just 3Js the act of judgment in genera:! was 
the " full fruit Df cognition " so too the gift of new ideas or 
images came to its fulness in the divinely given enlightenment 
en3Jbling the prophet to discern the meaning and truth of what 
·he had received.46 
For this reason, the divinely enlightened judgment "looms 
the ~larger in prophecy·" .47 In fact, the judgment by the 
prophet was, according to Aquinas, the revelation. It was the 
full revelatory act. The divine knowledge by itself was not 
revelation. There was no communication of it until the act of 
enlightenment in the mind of the prophet. Aquinas adhered to 
'
8 173, 2, Responsio: " Circa cognitionem autem humanae mentis duo 
oportet considerare, scilicet acceptionem sive repraesentationem rerum, et 
judicium de rebus repraesentatis." 
"173, 2, Responsio (as above in n. 42) : " acceptionem sine repraesenta-
tionem rerum, et judicium de rebus repraesentatis." 
'
11 173, 2, Responsio: "Just as the different ordering of the same letters of 
the alphabet produces different understandings, so too different dispositions 
of images bring out different intellectual species in the mind." 
' '
8 173, 2, Responsio: "Now by the gift of prophecy something is conferred 
on the human mind over and above the powers of its natural faculty in both 
respects, namely in respect of judgment by the infusion of intellectual light, 
and in respect of the acceptation or representation of realities which is done 
through certain species ... Of these two aspects of knowledge, the first looms 
larger in prophecy: because judgment is the full fruit of cognition." 
67 Note 45. 
458 THOMAS HUGHSON, S . .J. 
Augustine's statement, which he quoted in the first sentence 
of the Responsio, "Prophetic knowledge most of all relates to 
the mind "/8 and he filled in the content .of that throughout 
the artiole. 
Aquinas' analysis implies that Dulles' theology of symbolic 
mediation is incomplete to t he extent that it does not explain 
how the mediation of revelation occurs in the mind of the 
recipient. According to Aquinas nothing was actually revealed 
outside the mind of the prophet, and so no reality, no symbol 
can media>te revelation apart from the act of knowledge culmi-
nating in judgment, divinely enlightened. In Aquinas there can 
be no medium of revelation that pre-existed the act of judg-
ment because there was no revealing outside it. There was no 
mediating of divine knowledge, intent, truth, guidance, love, 
fidelity, etc. except in the divinely enlightened judgment of 
the prophet. An event, person, action, sign may have been po-
tentially Tevelatory outside the act of judgment, but it did not 
beco·me actually revelatory until it became the content judged. 
So, to the extent that there is a tendency in Models of Revela-
tion to describe the symbolic mediation of revelation as if it 
was actually symbolic and revelatory ·apart from the mind of 
a recipient, Aquinas' posit ion recalls the indissoluble link be-
tween symbol and knowledge of the symbol. The link does not 
appear forcefully and systematically enough in Dulles' exposi-
tion of the role and nature of symbol in mediating and express-
ing God and His will, above all in and through Christ . 
.. 
3. Ghrist as Revelatory Symbol in Qhapter X: 
Maximum Difficulty 
It can be argued that Aquinas did not plan and or-
ganize the Summa Theologiae Christocentrically; it is obvious 
that Aquinas took up the theme of revelation primarily under 
the heading of prophecy; and it is something of a problem that 
•s 173, 2, "Dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, cognitio prophetica 
maxime ad mentem pertinet" [Super Gen. ad l it t. xii, 9. PL 34, 401] . 
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he had little in the way of Christological revelation. Both 
White and Latourelle, it is true, adumbrate the Christological 
implications contained in the few powerful principles Aquinas 
did teach in the 3a. But, with the Christocentric approach to 
revelation now :firmly established, what is unexpected is an 
omission of part of that Christocentrism from Models of Reve-
lation. Dulles states in Chapter IX that " no clear dichotomy 
can be drawn between the symbolic and ·the non-symbolic ".49 
But Chapter X, " Christ, the Summit of Revelation ,, allows 
this to happen. 
There, dividing the symbolic £rom the non-symbolic leads 
strai·ght into the consequence thaJt Ohrist the revelatory sym-
bol did not interpret himself in non-symbolic judgments which 
would be central to his self-revelation. Ohrist, the supreme 
revelatory symbol, seems to exist witthout a human self-under-
standing. In Chapter X there is no role for that which modern 
Christology h.as come to think of as essential to appreciating 
the humanity of Chris~: his self-understanding or self-con-
sciousness or human s~bjectivity. The affirmative and nega-
tive judgments of self-definition, self-affirmation, and identity 
by which Jesus expressed and mediated himself do not figure 
into Dulles' theology of the revelatory Ghrist. Christ indeed 
is the fullness of revelation, reveals the Logos and, in that, the 
Father. And his .human response to the Father is the revela-
tion of the full human response to God. But apparently all of 
this is revelatory without the help of Ghrist's human ·mind in-
terpreting himself in acts that Aquinas would have identified 
as judgments. Ghrist's words do have a sm·all place in Dulles' 
theology. While "no doubt revelatory ",S0 they simply do not 
receive express attention insofar as they express and mediate 
. Christ~s seLf-understanding. It seems that because his inter-
pretative judgments that, for example, he is the Son of Man, 
or that some judgments made ·about him by others were ac-
ceptable and others, such as miracle-worker, were not fully 
'
11 Dulles, p. 132. 
110 Dulles, p. 161. 
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symbolic, they do not have a role in Chapter X. Acknowledg-
ing that Jesus was a teacher, Dulles insists that" Jesus taught 
by preference through parable and paradox ".51 This, in light 
of Dulles' view on revelatory words, means that Jesus taught 
symbolically only. This view of Jesus' teaching holds, above 
all, that" it is misleading to speak of Jesus as an authoritative 
teacher according to the schematization of the propositional 
model ".52 Little is offered by Dulles to compensate, however, 
for the absence of any role for Christ's self-interpretation as 
pa;rt of the content for, and as operative within, his teaching 
and preaching. 
The problem has a Chr:istological aspect, of course, insofar 
as Christ the revealer and the revealed seems not to e~gage in 
the affirmation of truth except insofar as this means being sym-
bolic, and acting and speaking symbolically. This would seem 
to delete the Johannine "I am" declarations, for example, or 
not to read them as .due in any way to Christ's own self-in-
terpreting judgments. But the fundamental-theological aspect 
.is that revelation in and by Christ seems to take place without 
any ·act of judgment by Christ on who and what he is. This 
may be .due to the faot that symbolizing is conceived first of 
all ontologically and in terms of formal causality. Although 
this is a way of understanding how· being is symbolic, it does 
not by that also succeed in showing how symbolizing is com-
munication between beings. 'Vhe symbolic ontology, but not 
.the full Christology, of Rahner informs Dulles' approach here. 
'r.he result, down-playing the role of . . Christ's self-understand-
ing, re-directs fundamental theology to the revelatory aspect of 
the Incarnation. But at the same time i1t fails to bring into ac-
count significant elements in Ohrist's activity before and after 
the Resurrection. The Synoptic version of Jesus' preaching, for 
example, summed up in Mark I: 14 as " the Kingdom of God 
is upon you; repent, and believe the gospel" contains a pro-
found act of judgment. '.Dhe Gospel does not consist solely in 
t51 Dulles, p. 161. 
e~2 Dulles, p. 161. 
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symbolizing through a likeness between God's and a king's 
reign, but asserts that something is so: not just "the kingdom 
of God" but " the kingdom of God is upon you". And Paul's 
revelation on the way to Damasous was the gift of light to 
know who it was that confronted him, a person Acts 9: 5 re-
ported to have said "I am Jesus whom you are persecuting". 
These are judgments, affirming something to be so. Some of 
the content may be symbolic, but the symbolic representations 
alone are but an essential part of what is revelatory. 
4. An Unexpected Conve~gence 
Nonetheless, Aquinas' principle that judgment is primary in 
the act of revelation does converge with Models of Revelation 
in two specific respects. First, it is not far removed from the 
way Dulles connects the revelatory sign-event to the discern-
ment of its meaning by an observer with an orientation to God 
and His plan. One of the merits Dulles incorporates from the 
revelation-~s-history model 53 is that it holds that certain 
events have an inherent divine meaning. However, he insists 
that .this meaning does not appear to academic or scientific 
research but to, and only to, a person with the appropria;te 
religious dispo·sition. So he argues that "a revelatory sign-
event, to the religiously disposed observer, can convey a divine 
meaning that truly belongs to the event ".54 The revelatory 
meaning does not evacuate the event of its own meaning nor 
add to it something extraneous; it identifies the divine mean-
ing within it.55 The E.xodus would probably be as good an ex-
ample of this as possible, though not one explicitly cited. Per-
haps more important for the convergence with Aquinas than 
the religious disposition of the observer of the event is the fact 
s.a Dulles, Chapter IV, ((Revelation as History" and in sections by that 
title in Chapters IX-XVI. 
11
' Dulles, p. 146. 
1111 Dulles disagrees with W. Pannenberg's contention that rational analysis 
by itself can interpret the revelation in history, and that no special illumina-
tion is needed to interpret the meaning in the events; cf. "Pannenberg: 
Revelation as History", pp. 58-60 in Chapter IV. 
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that the event remains incomplete as revelation until the ob-
server interprets its meaning correctly. In clarifying this facet 
of a revelatory sign-event, he states that tJ?_e "revelation, then, 
is not situaJted outside the interpreter's mind, as though it were 
a physical object, nor is it something added on to the event , 
coming from bhe subjectivity of the interpreter ... " 56 With-
out denying thaJt the event has meaning, objectively as it were, 
Dulles refuses to isolate the event from the act of its interpre-
tation.57 Aquinas' analysis would add that knowledge and in-
terpretation of that event comes to its own fullness in the judg-
ment interpreting it in divinely given light. 
Yet it would do some violence to Aquinas to say that his 
theology of revelation concurs with Dulles in regarding histori-
cal events as symbols, mediating divine meaning. To the con-
trary, the primacy of judgment in prophecy implies that that 
whioh constitutes the full aot of .revelation, judgment, does not 
so mooh mediate revelation as illuminate contents which, by 
that illumination alone, become revelatory. It is the contents 
(but not propositions) known prior to and then in judgment 
that have a role closest to that given to symbols by Dulles. If 
anything could be said to mediate revelation for Aquinas it 
would be the representations or species (sensed, imagined, or 
thou~ht) not the judgment. The· light given for judgment 
could not mediate because of itself it is not content but power 
to reach tJhe truth in what is known. Whether the light be 
uncreated or created, it could not mediate anything because 
it does not add new species to the co~rtent of what the prophet 
is given to know. With this said, there need be no difficulty 
in accepting White's view that Aquinas recognized that it is 
" the immense richness and variety of symbolism which revela-
tion has employed for its medium ",58 The "symbolism which 
56 Dulles, p. 146. 
117 He grants, with Pannenberg, that the event is meaningful. However, 
Pannenberg considers the linguistic element something prior to faith that be-
longs to the event, and is a mat ter of rational analysis. Cf. Dulle , P· 59. 
118 White, p. 11. 
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revelation has employed for its medium " is that which is 
known, the species. And the truth is in the judgment on what 
is known. · 
Secondly, 173,2 and Models of Revelation converge insofar 
as each understands revelation to involve creatures. Aquinas 
did not neglect the essential role of the representations, the 
species or knowledge in the revelatory judging. Even in the 
cases in which God gives only new l~ight for judging what the 
prophet already knows in an ordinary way, something is 
judged, and this is some created real,ity grasped in new and 
divine perspective. In cases where God gives new knowledge 
·as well as new light for judging it, the created realities known 
have ·an indispensable role as the contents in which the prophet 
begins to perceive something of divine things. Similarly, 
Dulles' whole theology of revelation depends on the principle 
that "revelation never occurs in a purely interior experience 
or an unmediated encounter with God ".59 He criticizes the 
model of revelation-as-inner-e:xverience 60 precisely for con-
ceiving divine self-manifestation as ineffable mystical nearnes-s 
andnomore. . 
But, again, for Aquinas the created realities known and 
judged in prophecy need not be verbal statements. And, the 
knowledge of created reality to be judged could come in every-
day fashion from other human beings. Joseph and Daniel, for 
example, learned the contents of Bharoah's and N ebuchad-
nezzar's dreams through oral communication of an ordinary 
·sort. Yet, neither the dreams nor the verbal statements re-
porting bhem constituted the prophecy. The knowledge gained 
from propositions was of images which were not yet revelatory 
until the Lord enlightened Joseph and Daniel. Those cases, 
. along with that of the new understanding the Apostles re-
ceived allowing them to grasp the truth in the Old Testament 
in new fullness, exemplified how prophecy was essentially judg-
ment. For in these three cases, the revelation did not consist in 
118 Dulles, p. 131. 
eo Dulles, Chapter V, "Model Three: Revelation as Inner Experience." 
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the realities known and communicated through human means 
but in new judgment. By divine light, the prophet could" pass 
judgment on those realities which have been seen by others as 
was .said of Joseph and as appears with the Apostles, 'The 
Lord opened their minds so that they should understand the 
Scriptures' ".61 The means by which the knowledge came into 
the act of judgment was not what constituted prophetic reve-
·lation. Rather the judgment in divine light that affirmed and 
asserted the truth in what had been received was the formal 
characteristic of prophecy. 
An unexpected turn in the dialogue between Dulles and 
Aquinas happens when Dulles re-admits something like judg-
ment back into his theology in his final Chapter. In Chapter 
XVI, " Revelation at its Present Value ", Dulles briefly con-
siders the objection that the very idea of divine revelation pre-
sumes an identifiable demarcation between revealed and 
acquired knowledge. 
He asserts that " the reality of revelation in no way depends 
on a clear line of dema;rcation " 62 ·between revealed and ac-
quired knowledge. 11his might seem to run counter to Aquinas' 
theology but it actually does not, because for Aquinas pro-
phetic revelation did not always involve revealed knowledge 
in the form of divinely conferred species. It sometimes was a 
·matter of new light for judgment upon acquired knowledge. 
In these cases, the content for judgment would be ae.quired 
knowledge while the act of judging would be enlightened by 
God and would make the whole act revelatory. In the one 
revelatory judgment, therefore; acquired · knowledge became 
divinely revealing due to the judgment interpreting it. This 
principle does not fully answer the objection, norr does it make 
Aquinas completely compatible with Dulles' response. It does 
61 173, 2, Responsio·: " But a prophet is he whose mind only is enlightened 
to pass judgment even on those elements which have been seen by others in 
imaginative forms ... God sometimes infuses an intellectual light into the 
mind of man so as to pass judgment ... ". 
62 Dulles, p. 273. 
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indicate an area in which Dulles and Aquinas do not stand as 
far apart as might easily be .thought. 
Dulles goes on to acknowledge that " it is true that all reve-
lation is acquired by the subject who receives it ".63 In this re-
spect, there can be complete concurrence with Aquinas' locat-
ing of revelation in the mind of the prophet. And when Dulles 
proceeds to identify revelation as "knowledge or awareness 
gained through bhe special assistance of God " 64 he holds a 
view in close proximity to Aquinas on the special assistance by 
which God gives either new species or, and frequently, new 
lig~t. He does not go into detail on the nature of the special 
dime assistance but indicates that the content so known is 
how God "freely manifests himself through tangible clues." 65 
5. The Role of Interpretation: 
Models of Revelation and 173,2. 
Both Dulies and Aquinas locate an act of interpretation 
within the occurrence of.revelation. When analyzing the merits 
of the revelation-as-history model, Dulles spells out that role . 
He qualifies the interpretation of the revelatory sign-event by 
distinguishing academic or historical interpretation from reli-
gious interpretation. Only the " religiously disposed observer " 
is capable of discerning the " divine meaning that truly belongs 
to the event ".66 In that religious interpretation, the meaning 
does not come from the observer but from the event. And in 
that act of discernment there occurs the revelation given by 
means of historical event. The role of the interpreting act also 
plays a part in his examination and sublation of the revelation-
as-dialectical presence model. He points out that any non-
, verbal symbol through which God manifests Himself needs an 
accompanying word to interpret it. 
The word itself, however, is the most spiritual of symbols. 
68 Dulles, p. 273. 
6
' Dulles, p. 273. 
416 Dulles, p. 273. 
66 Dulles, p. 146. 
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The word " is the sign which articulates meaning ". 67 Dulles 
does not divide nonverbal from verbal revelation. Rather the 
word is "a necessary complement to revelation through any 
other kind of symbol ".68 Any other symbol (e.g. nature, deed, 
artifact) " .becomes revelation only when interpreted and inter-
pretation never occurs without a linguistic component ".69 
Dulles refuses to accept, that is, a conventional division be-
tween deed and word, and in seeing both as complementary to 
one another he moves along the path outlined by Vatican II 
in " Dei Verbum ". 70 
Dulles gives this view an unusual nuance consistent with the 
principle that only symbols mediate revelation. He identifies 
the verbal aspect of revelation as symbolic, not as explanatory 
or as doctrine. While~ there is the need for " external words, 
capable of being heard or seen" within public relevation, they 
share the symbolic character of what they attest. These words 
have the purpose of bringing into statement the preverbal 
meaning symbolized in an event, person, deed, etc. But the 
words have a symbolic nature themselve~ and are" necessarily 
symbolic, for otherwise they could not be conducive to a sal-
vific union with the divine ".71 The words, therefore, do not 
perfor,m the same function as doctrines, which also derive from 
· symbolized divine meaning. Doctrine, however, arises in cross-
ing over from the symbolic to the non-symbolic. For Dulles, 
words as part of revelation remain on the side of the symbolic. 
Aquinas held a different view. 173,2 located revelation in the 
act of divinely enlightened judgment in t he m~ind of the 
prophet. 'f\his tied the non-verbal and verbal inextricably to-
gether. For example, Jeremiah's non-verbal imaginative vision 
67 Dulles, p. 152. 
68 Dulles, p. 152. 
'69 Dulles, p. 152. 
10 Austin Flannery, O.P., Editor, Vatican Council II: The Conciliar a.nd 
Post Conciliar Documents, pp. 750-765, "The economy of Revelation is realized 
by deeds and words, which are intrinsically bound up with each other," P· 
751. 
11 Dulles, p. 152. 
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became that which was grasped and then proclaimed in words 
to Israel. The communication is extrinsic to the revelation but 
the prophecy has an orientation toward this public declaration 
by the fact of its being part of God's salvific plan as weU as 
by the public ,scope of its content. 
But, more to the point, Aquinas also saw the sy1mbolic and 
the non-symbolic as indissoluble from one another within the 
-act of revelation. It was not Aquinas' objective in 173,2 to ex-
pand on precisely that point. Yet his account of prophecy per-
,mits that conclusion £rom the analysis he gives. Four Old 
T~stament prophecies in this article are essentially interpreta-
tions of symbols. In each case, the act of revelation was the 
event of interpretation in the mind of the prophet. In none of 
these cases was revelation located primarily in the knowledge 
prior to judgment. In every instance, that act of prophetic 
judgment had symbolic species OT knowledge as its oontent 
which the divine gift enlightened. Because the content and the 
judgment are inseparable f.rom each other in any act of judg-
ing, for Aquinas' analysis in 173,2 at least, the symbolic spe-
cies and the non-symbolic affirmation are likewise indivisible 
from one another. 
In the case of Jeremiah's vision of "a boiling pot facing 
away from the north " (Jer. 1: 13), the revelation was not 
given by the conferring of this image or the re-arranging of 
familiar images to produce this one. The grasp of its meaning 
in the act of judgment completed and formally constituted the 
prophecy. The uninterpreted image was not yet the word of 
the Lord. Jeremiah's grasp of its meaning in the act of inter-
pretation saw the forecasting of Judah's affliction by armies 
advancing from the north. '.Dhis was the word of the Lord 
· (Jer. 1: 14££) . 
In the three cases mentioned above, f.rom Genesis 41, Daniel 
1, and Daniel 5, it was not the representations of a symbolic 
sort that were the revelations. In fact Aquinas introduced eaoh 
to support the exact point that the judgment alone was the 
revelatory act. In each case, judgment was nothing other than 
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an act interpreting symbols, whether they were Pharoah's 
dreamed images, N ebuchadnezzar' s towering figure in the 
troubling dream, or the eerie spectacle of wo:rds written across 
Belshazzar's wall. In none of these cases was the symbolism 
self-evident or self-interpreting. 'llhe symbolic images, given 
by God indeed, remained enigmatic and perplexing until the 
revelatory act occurred in divinely enlightened interpretation. 
In these prophecies, the symbolic image-s formed ·the content 
of the prophet's judgment while the judgment itself provided 
their meaning in a non-sym·bolic judgment. Moreover, it can 
be noted that the symbolism was not so rich in meaning that 
it was unable to be grasped in its meaning. To the contraJry, 
the meaning was precise, definite, and divinely causative upon 
events. Aquinas considered the symbolic and non-symbolic to 
be as closely and indivisibly joined together as the content and 
the act of judgment were elements in one act. Symbol and in-
terpretation could not be, on this view, considered in isolation 
from one another. Symbolic representations became actually . 
revelatory not by their presence in someone's imagination but 
by their meaning's being grasped and affirmed within the gift 
of divine illumination. 
Interpretation has, then, a different nature for Dulles and 
for Aquinas. In Models of Revelation, the interpreting word 
belongs within revelation as a symbolic statement of non-
verbal, symbolized meaning. In the Summa Theologiae, 173,2, 
the revelatory act of judgment in four cases is precisely an act 
interpreting ~symbols, and it is the transition from the symbol 
to the non-symbolic. Dulles reserves such a transition to the 
passage from revelatory symbols into doctrinal propositions, a 
helpful adjunct to revelation, but not part of it. It would be 
difficult, on this count, for Aquinas' theology to separate sym-
bolized meaning from doctrine.72 It would be more consistent 
to link symbol and content of judgment as symbol and doc-
trine, both indivisibly within the act of revealing. 
12 Might it not be possible that a divinely enlightened judgment by 11 
prophet, or by Christ, or by an apostle could contain more truth than any · 
single statement could express and convey? 
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6. Inquiry Arising From Models of Revelation 
Dialogue involves questions in two directions. 173,2 has 
served to raise the question about the truth in revelation and 
about the role of judgment in it. But Models of Revelation 
can also become the source for inquiry into the Summa Theo-
logiae. Can it evoke something new from a classical theology 
of revelation? 
The answer is positive. Dulles' stress on the symbolic na-
ture of divine revelation draws an incontrovertible yet un-
noticed fact into view. In 173,2 Aquinas brought a number 
of individual instances of prophecy into his analysis. Four 
have symbolic imagery as their content, their species. And 
since there is no reason to think that prophetic judgment has 
a nature separate from any human judgment, in its human 
aspect, what is true of prophetic judgment is true of human 
judgment generally.73 And something remarkable is true of 
prophetic judgment in 173,2. 
Joseph, Jeremiah, and Daniel perform acts of judgment that 
do not mani.fest the plain, straight-forwaJrd simplicity usually 
characteristic of judgments in the " X is Y " form. The acts 
of revelation do not take place in direct predication affirming 
what or that something is or is not. Rabher, and precisely be-
cause their content is symbolic, their judgments have an "X 
means Y" structure. Their function is to interpret symbols. 
The dreams of Pharoah and Nebuchadnezzar, the image seen 
by Jeremiah, the writing on Belshazzar's wall are symbols be-
cause they are more than glyphs indicating something outside 
themselves. 'llhese images, on the contrary, in some way make 
present what they mean, they embody what they signify, they 
78 Denis Bradley, "Aristotelian Science and the Science of Thomistic 
Theology", Heythrop Journal, vol. 22, April 81 , 161-171, emphasizes that 
"revelation, as St. Thomas under to d it, i fundamentally circumscribed; it 
alters what we know but not how w know", p. 168 . But hi s comment that 
"divine grace can strengthen the· intellect " in revelation docs not also note 
that in revelation the way divine grace acts is precisely as divine enlighten-
ment for judging, p. 168. 
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are the presence of that meaning. They belong to that kind 
of sign Dulles defined as a symbol-" an externally perceived 
sign that works mysteriously on the human consciousness so 
·as to suggest more than it can clearly describe or define ".14 
Dreamed imagery can be included among external signs both 
because it has sensible qualities and because these dreams 
were regarded as coming from outside the dreamers. However, 
the meaning of the imagery was unavailable until the prophetic 
enlightenment interpreted it. 
The revelatory acts by prophets in four cases in 173,2 that 
is, are acts grasping the meaning in symbols. Their judgments 
did not have the purpose or form of affirming, for example, 
that these were only images, not realities, or that God acts in 
the lives of people. They did not affirm diTectly and simply 
what or that something is. Instead they grasped and affirmed 
what something meant. 
Because of this quality in the judgments, what Aquinas con-
sidered to be instances of intellectual judgment seem able to be 
considered under the heading of interpretation. The prophets 
were enlightened by God to give full and just interpretation 
of symbolized meanings.75 This implication links Aquinas' 
theology of revelation and the theory of judgment within it to 
hermeneutics. This does not locate a fully hermeneutical ap-
proach in the Summa Theologiae~ not least of all because for 
Aquinas judgment has an interiority prior to (but insepar3Jhle 
from?) language. But there is some basis here for regarding 
173,2 as both exemplifying and adding to Aquinas' theology in 
a way that invites ·further analysis of the hermeneutical aspects 
in his theology and philosophy. 
Such analysis would be the optimal context within which to 
place a propositional element in Aquinas' theology of revela-
tion. Not that verbal propositions are formulated by God, 
74 Dulles p. 131. 
111 Cf. I , 1, 9 on the suitability of symbols and metaphorical language in 
the Bible ; and cf. Regino Cortes, O.P. "Biblical Foundations of St. Thomas' 
Treatise on Prophecy", Phillipiana, Sacra,, 10, 1975, pp. 7-29. 
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tl'lans·mitted as such to a prophet, then received in an affirma-
tive judgment, but that the act of enlightened judgment can 
have an interpretative element, namely the judging itself. 
Then, the inner word of truth could be understood to be an 
interpreting judgment. In that context, the propositional ele-
ment in the act of revelation is the interpretative element. 
And then, if Dulles wishes to keep an interpretative element 
entirely outside ·symbolic revelation, the question arises, how 
C8in an uninterpreted symbol be revelatory? Is there an unin-
terrupted, unbroken circle of symbolic communication in reve-
la~ion, or anywhere? As D. Lane wondered, "is a theology of 
revelation as symbolic not a starting-point for further con-
sideration rather than an end-point as it seems to be in IV! odels 
of Revelation?" 76 One suspects that Dulles might well answer, 
"yes." 
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